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STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE
Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary
Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency
ABSTRACT
Where the contract between a corporation and one of its creditors is silent on some
question, should the law invoke fiduciary duties as a gap-filler? In general, the law
has declined to do so. There is some precedent, however, for the proposition that
directors of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to bondholders and other creditors
once the firm is in the vicinity of insolvency.
Courts embracing the zone of insolvency doctrine have characterized the duties
of directors as running to the corporate entity rather than any individual constitu-
ency. This approach is incoherent in practice and insupportable in theory. Courts
should focus on whether the board has an obligation to give sole concern to the
interests of a specific constituency of the corporation.
Concern that shareholders will gamble with the creditors' money is the principal
argument for imposing a duty on the board running to creditors when the corpo-
ration is in the vicinity of insolvency. On close examination, however, this argu-
ment proves unpersuasive. It is director and manager opportunism, rather than
strategic behavior by shareholders that is the real concern. Because bondholders
and other creditors are better able to protect themselves against that risk than are
shareholders, there is no justification for imposing such a duty.
This Article also argues that the zone debate is much ado about very little. The
only cases in which the zone of insolvency debate matters are those to which the
business judgment rule does not apply, shareholders' and creditors' interests con-
flict, and a recovery could go directly to those who have standing to sue. In those
cases, as this Article explains, there is a strong policy argument that creditors
should be limited to whatever rights the contract provides or might be inferred
from the implied covenant of good faith.
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INTRODUCTION
THE TWO MOST BASIC QUESTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE are (i) Who decides?
In other words, what organ within the corporation ultimately is in control? (ii)
Whose interests prevail? When the ultimate decision maker is presented with a zero
sum game, in which it must prefer the interests of one constituency over those of
others, which constituency prevails?
The latter question animates the corporate social responsibility debate. At one
end of the spectrum are those who contend corporations should be run so as to
maximize shareholder wealth. At the other end are stakeholderists, who argue that
directors and managers should consider the interests of all corporate constituencies
in making corporate decisions.' In this Article, I take up a subset of that larger
debate; namely, the fiduciary duties, if any, owed by a corporation's board of direc-
tors to creditors of the corporation when the company is in the "vicinity of
insolvency."2
William D. Warren Professor, UCLA School of Law. I thank the participants at the "Zone" conference
for their comments. I also thank Roberta Romano and Bill Klein for constructive critiques. This paper was
presented as the keynote address at the "Conference on Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and
Creditors of Troubled Companies," which was held at the University of Maryland School of Law on November
4, 2005.
1. As applied to corporation law and policy, the term "stakeholders" reportedly originated in a 1963
Stanford Research Institute memorandum as a descriptive term for "those groups without whose support the
organization would cease to exist." R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New
Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 89 (1983).
2. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) ("At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency,
a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate
enterprise.").
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In the dominant contractarian theory of the corporation,' corporate law is un-
derstood as providing a standard form contract for the parties.' In other words,
where the actual contracts reflected in the corporation's organic documents are
silent, the law fills in the gaps. In particular, the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
owed to shareholders can be understood as gap-fillers that complete the contract
between the corporation and its equity investors.
5
The shareholder-corporation contract, however, is not the only one that is in-
complete. As with any relational contract, bond indentures and other long-term
debt agreements also inevitably prove incomplete. In a world characterized by un-
certainty, complexity, and bounded rationality, it cannot be otherwise.6 Where the
bond indenture is silent, should the law invoke fiduciary duties or other extra-
contractual rights as gap-fillers? As we shall see, the law has declined to do so.' We
shall also see, however, there is some precedent for the proposition that directors of
a corporation do owe fiduciary duties to bondholders and other creditors once the
firm is in the vicinity of insolvency.
Part II of this Article summarizes the relevant legal rules. It begins with a review
of the precedents establishing the basic rule that directors have a fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder wealth. It then turns to the precedents on fiduciary duties, if
any, owed to creditors.
3. The nexus of contracts model treats the corporation as a nexus of contracts among the various factors
of production. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 18 (1996) (describing the firm as
"a nexus of contracts," by which he means that the "firm is in essence the common signatory of a group of
contracts" among various factors of production). Contractarians thus conceptualize the firm not as an entity,
but as an aggregate of various inputs acting together to produce goods or services. Employees provide labor.
Creditors provide debt capital. Shareholders initially provide equity capital and subsequently bear the risk of
losses and monitor the performance of management. Management monitors the performance of employees
and coordinates the activities of all the firm's inputs. The board supervises management and sets overall policy.
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416
(1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318-28 (1993). As for
the dominance of the nexus of contracts model in the corporate law academy, see also William T. Allen,
Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (former Delaware
Chancellor opining that the nexus of contracts model of the firm is now the "dominant legal academic view").
4. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Cor-
porate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1781 (2001) ("Contractarian commentators.., argue that corporate law is
best understood as a kind of standard form contract for governing relationships among officers, directors, and
shareholders."). Providing a standard form contract, of course, is not the sole function of corporation law. Law
also provides institutional features that could not be effected by internal contracts. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 406-23 (2000) (arguing that
parties could not effect "affirmative asset partitioning" by contract). The firm thus has both contractual and
institutional attributes.
5. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
92-93 (1991). Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (1990) (arguing that "courts should treat an allega-
tion of breach of a fiduciary duty as they would treat any alleged breach of contract").
6. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 23 (1975) (arguing that, under conditions of
uncertainty and complexity, it becomes "very costly, perhaps impossible, to describe the complete decision
tree").
7. See infra Part I.B.
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Part III addresses the policy arguments. It begins by criticizing the framing given
to the issue by Delaware courts. Those courts have characterized the duties of di-
rectors as running to the corporate entity rather than any individual constituency.
This approach is incoherent in practice and insupportable in theory. Instead,
courts should focus on whether the board has an obligation to give sole attention
to the interests of a specific constituency of the corporation. Part III then reviews
the leading argument in favor of imposing fiduciary duties to creditors when the
corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency; namely, the notion that shareholders
will gamble with the creditors' money. I conclude that this argument is unpersua-
sive. It is the director and manager opportunism, rather than strategic behavior by
shareholders, which is the real concern. Part III concludes by arguing that bond-
holders and other creditors are better able to protect themselves against that risk
than are shareholders.
Finally, Part IV asks whether any of this matters very much. Even if the fiduciary
duties owed by directors shift in the vicinity of insolvency from shareholders to
creditors (or run to both in that setting), the vast majority of board of directors'
decisions should continue to be insulated from judicial review by the business
judgment rule. Because I argue that the rule should apply even to decisions in
which the board makes trade offs between the interests of shareholders and credi-
tors (or declines to make such trade offs), the debate arguably ends up being much
ado about nothing (or, at least, about very little).
I. THE LAW
Corporate law does not mandate corporate social responsibility. To the contrary,
the real question is whether the law even permits corporate social responsibility.
Put another way, to what extent do the fiduciary duties of corporate directors per-
mit them to consider the interests of creditors and other nonshareholder constitu-
encies when making corporate decisions? After establishing that the law allows
directors to do so only to the extent such consideration redounds to the best inter-
ests of the shareholders, this Part asks whether those duties change when the cor-
poration is in the vicinity of insolvency.
A. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
The law's basic position on corporate social responsibility famously was articulated
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.' In 1916 Henry Ford owned fifty-eight percent of the
stock of Ford Motor Company.9 The Dodge brothers owned ten percent, with five
other individuals owning the remaining shares.'l Beginning in 1908, Ford Motor
8. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
9. See id. at 669- 70 (summarizing holdings of the parties).
10. Id.
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paid a regular annual dividend of $1.2 million." Between 1911 and 1915, Ford
Motor also regularly paid huge "special dividends," totaling over $40 million.' 2 In
1916, Henry Ford announced that the company would stop paying special divi-
dends.' 3 Instead, the firm's financial resources would be devoted to expanding its
business.'4 Ford also continued the company's policy of lowering prices, while im-
proving quality.' The Dodge brothers sued, asking the court to order Ford Motor
to resume paying the special dividends and to enjoin the proposed expansion of the
firm's operations.16 At trial, Ford testified to his belief that the company made too
much money and had an obligation to benefit the public and the firm's workers
and customers. 7
The plaintiff Dodge brothers contended an improper altruism" towards his
workers and customers motivated Ford. 9 The court agreed, strongly rebuking
Ford:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes.2"
Consequently, "it is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of share-
holders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others."
2
'
11. Id. at 670.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 671.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 683-84 (discussing Henry Ford's plans for the corporation).
16. Id. at 673.
17. See id. at 683-84 (summarizing Henry Ford's testimony).
18. The term altruism is used herein to describe any decision motivated by considerations other than
shareholder wealth maximization. It thus includes, but also is much broader than, the special case of corporate
philanthropy.
19. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671-73 (summarizing Dodge brothers' allegations).
20. Id. at 684.
21. Id. For an interesting interpretation of Dodge, which argues that the shareholder wealth maximization
norm originated as a means for resolving disputes among majority and minority shareholders in closely held
corporations, see D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 1. CORP. L. 277, 306-09 (1998). I am
skeptical of Smith's interpretation. In the first instance, the court's own analysis in Dodge is not limited to close
corporations. Smith places considerable emphasis on the sentence immediately preceding the court's statement
of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See id. at 319 (using italics for emphasis). In that sentence, the
court draws a distinction between the duties Ford believed he and his fellow stockholders owed to the general
public "and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders." Dodge, 170
N.W. at 684 (emphasis added). On its face, the duty to which the court refers is that of a director rather than
the duties of a majority shareholder. (Concededly, both the specific passage in question and the opinion in
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To be sure, a few cases posit that directors need not treat shareholder wealth
maximization as their sole guiding star. A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,"
the most frequently cited example, upheld a corporate charitable donation on the
ground, inter alia, that "modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge
and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communi-
ties within which they operate."" Ultimately, however, the differences between Bar-
low and Dodge have little more than symbolic import. As the Barlow court
recognized, decisions (such as charitable giving) that appear harmful to share-
holder interests in the short run often redound to shareholder benefit in the long
run.24 Because the court acknowledged that the challenged contribution could be
justified on profit-maximizing grounds, its broader language on corporate social
responsibility is arguably mere dictum. In any event, Barlow remains the minority
view."
Indeed, Dodge's norm of shareholder wealth maximization has been widely ac-
cepted by courts over an extended period of time. Almost three quarters of a cen-
tury after Dodge, for example, the Delaware Chancery Court similarly opined in
Katz v. Oak Industries:26 "It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law,
to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders ....27 Setting
aside "a possible exception or two," Robert Clark concludes, "courts have not re-
treated from the assumption that the primary or residual purpose of a business
corporation is to make profits for its shareholders."2
Dodge does not stand for the proposition that directors will be held liable for
considering the social consequences of corporate actions, however, despite its
general are sufficiently ambiguous to permit Smith's interpretation.) In the second instance, whatever Dodge
originally meant, the evolutionary processes of the common law have led to Dodge being interpreted as estab-
lishing a basic rule for boards of directors; namely, that the board has a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.
As Smith himself concedes, moreover, his interpretation departs from the "consensus" of most corporate law
scholars. Smith, supra, at 283.
22. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
23. Id. at 586. See also Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969) (opining
that corporate social responsibility is a desirable goal).
24. Barlow, 98 A.2d at 586. Despite its strong emphasis on the board's obligation to pursue shareholder
interests, the Dodge court likewise recognized that, in many situations, ethical or humanitarian considerations
are wholly consistent with long-term shareholder wealth maximization. Providing employees with health care
benefits costs money in the short run, for example, but in the long run healthy employees with high morale
may be more productive. A board of directors thus may decide to incur such short-run costs in order to reap
long-term gains without fear of liability:
The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of
the employls [sic], like the building of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for
the betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the expense
of others, is obvious.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
25. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2.2, at 682 n.ll (1986) (discussing Barlow).
26. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
27. Id. at 879.
28. CLARK, supra note 25, §16.2.2 at 682.
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strongly pro-shareholder wealth maximization rhetoric. To be sure, having found
that Ford had failed to pursue shareholder wealth maximization, the court ordered
Ford Motor to resume paying its substantial special dividends.29 Invoking the busi-
ness judgment rule,3" however, the Dodge court declined to interfere with Ford's
plans for expansion and dismissed the bulk of plaintiff's complaint."
A similar result was reached in one of corporate law's hoariest chestnuts, Shlen-
sky v. Wrigley,32 in which a minority shareholder in the Chicago Cubs sued P.K.
Wrigley, the team's majority shareholder, over the latter's famous refusal to install
lights at Wrigley Field. Shlensky claimed the decision against lights was motivated
by Wrigley's beliefs that baseball was a daytime sport and that night baseball might
have a deteriorating effect on the neighborhood surrounding Wrigley Field.3 De-
spite Shlensky's apparently uncontested evidence that Wrigley was more concerned
with nonshareholder than with shareholder interests, the Illinois Appellate Court
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.34 Although
this result on superficial examination may appear to devalue shareholder wealth
maximization, on close examination the decision rests on a straightforward appli-
cation of the business judgment rule.3"
To be sure, some scholars rely on cases like Shlensky to argue that the business
judgment rule is intended to allow directors to make trade-offs between the inter-
ests of shareholder and nonshareholder constituencies. 6 In fact, however, although
29. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919) (summarizing holding).
30. The business judgment rule, of course, pervades every aspect of corporate law, from allegedly negli-
gent decisions by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to board decisions to seek dismissal of shareholder
litigation, and so on. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (exemplifying dismissal of
derivative litigation); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (exemplifying fiduciary duties of
controlling shareholder); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (exemplifying operational
discretion). Two conceptions of the business judgment rule compete in the case law. One treats the rule as
having substantive content. In this version, the business judgment rule comes into play only after one has first
determined that the directors satisfied some standard of conduct. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs rebut the business judgment rule's presumption of good faith
by "providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of
their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care."). Alternatively, the business judgment rule is seen as an
abstention doctrine. Under this version, the court will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the
directors' conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule's presumption of good faith. See,
e.g., Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 779 (holding that "In a purely business corporation ... the authority of the
directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation must be regarded as absolute when they act within
the law, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the directors.") (alteration in
original). For reasons developed elsewhere at length, I find the abstention version more persuasive. See Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 109 (2004).
31. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 ("We are not, however, persuaded that we should interfere with the pro-
posed expansion of the business of the Ford Motor Company.").
32. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
33. Id. at 778.
34. Id. at 778-80.
35. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971,
978-79 (1992) (discussing Shlensky).
36. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 303 (1999) (arguing that the business judgment rule authorizes directors to make trade offs between
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that may sometimes be the effect of the rule, it is an unintended consequence of
operationalizing an entirely different policy goal. As the Delaware Supreme Court
has explained: "The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full
and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors." 7 On
balance, this policy of judicial deference to the board of directors' exercise of discre-
tionary authority redounds to the shareholders' best interests, as I have demon-
strated elsewhere in detail,3" even though the rule occasionally allows directors to
escape liability in connection with decisions that failed to maximize shareholder
wealth.
Courts have recognized that the business judgment rule rests on shareholder-
oriented policy considerations. In Joy v. North,9 for example, Judge Ralph Winter
explained that:
Although the [business judgment] rule has suffered under academic criticism,
it is not without rational basis .... [B]ecause potential profit often corresponds
to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law
not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions .... Shareholders
can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the
diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the
best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even
shareholder and nonshareholder interests); Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind's Education: Using
Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 831
(1997) (arguing that the business judgment rule reflects "an underlying distrust of the strict fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder returns"). For an argument that Blair and Stout misinterpreted the law in this area, see
David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law,
86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1009-20 (2000).
Some of these same scholars have argued that the so-called nonshareholder constituency statutes adopted
by many states (although not Delaware) call into question the continuing validity of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra, at 303 n.144; Greenfield & Nilsson, supra, at 838-39. As I
have argued elsewhere, however, these statutes do not entirely reject the traditional shareholder wealth max-
imization norm. Instead, they modify the norm by allowing the board to make trade-offs between shareholder
and stakeholder interests. Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 989-96. As such, the statutes admittedly work an
unfortunate change in the basic normative principles underlying corporate law. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In
Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1423, 1423-24 n.2 (1993). Fortunately, courts seem to be ignoring these statutes and, at present, they appear to
be little more than dust gathering relics of the 1980s wave of state antitakeover legislation. See id. (noting the
"dearth of cases"). The nonshareholder constituency statutes were just another example of special interest
legislation adopted at the behest of union leaders and managers of target corporations to protect important
local businesses from takeovers. Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 993.
37. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001). Cf. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996) (noting that
"shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the managerial discretion of corporate boards. f I Consequently,
we have historically been reluctant to permit shareholder derivative suits, noting that the power of courts to
direct the management of a corporation's affairs should be 'exercised with restraint.'"); Pogostin v. Rice, 480
A.2d 619, 624 (noting that "the derivative action impinges on the managerial freedom of directors").
38. Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 109-29.
39. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
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greater gains in others .. . .A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly
riskier alternatives thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.4"
Delaware Chancellor William Allen advanced a slightly different, but still share-
holder-focused, rationale for the rule in Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc.:'
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small propor-
tionate ownership. interest in their corporations and little or no incentive com-
pensation. Thus, they enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion
of any "upside"gains earned by the corporation on risky investment projects. If,
however, corporate directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a
risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky ... their liability
would be joint and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a right of contri-
bution). Given the scale of operation of modern public corporations, this stupe-
fying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens
undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a very small probability of di-
rector liability based on "negligence", "inattention", "waste", etc., could induce a
board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! Obviously,
it is in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to direc-
tors from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a
practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet mini-
mal proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a
business loss.2
In both cases, the policy rationale for the business judgment rule exclusively
focuses on shareholder interests.
The legitimacy of the distinction drawn here between the business judgment
rule's intent and effect is further confirmed by those cases in which the business
judgment rule does not apply, especially those involving a board of director's re-
sponse to an unsolicited takeover bid. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,4 3 for
40. Id. at 885-86 (citations omitted). Or, as Chancellor Allen similarly observed in Gagliardi v. Trifoods
International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996):
Shareholders can diversify the risks of their corporate investments. Thus, it is in their economic
interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all positive net present value investment projects
available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk adjusted rate of return first. Shareholders
don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse. Shareholders' investment inter-
ests, across the full range of their diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if corporate
directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest
risk adjusted returns available that are above the firm's cost of capital.
Id. at 1052.
41. 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
42. Id. at 1052.
43. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Several judicial opinions outside Delaware suggest that boards may consider
nonshareholder interests in making structural decisions. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d
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example, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the board could consider "the
impact [of the bid] on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, cus-
tomers, employees, and perhaps even the community) ... .. " In that case, however,
a "corporate raider with a national reputation as a 'greenmailer"' faced Unocal's
board with a structurally coercive bid.45 Accordingly, the directors reasonably be-
lieved that the bid was not in the best interests of any corporate constituency and,
on the facts before the court there arguably was no conflict between shareholder
and stakeholder interests.
Suppose, however, the bidder made a fairly priced, non-coercive offer, but also
announced plans to close plants and lay off numerous workers. The target's board
of directors reasonably concluded that the negative impact on its employees ex-
ceeded the gains shareholders would garner. Did Unocal really permit the board to
turn down such an offer?
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.,46 the Delaware Supreme
Court answered that question in the negative, adding two crucial provisos to Uno-
cal. The first is of general applicability, forbidding the target's board from protect-
ing stakeholder interests at the expense of shareholder interests. Rather, any
management action benefiting stakeholders must produce ancillary shareholder
benefits.4" In other words, directors may only consider stakeholder interests if doing
so would benefit shareholders.48 Second, where a corporate control auction trigger-
ing the so-called Revlon duties has begun, stakeholders become entirely irrelevant.
Instead, shareholder wealth maximization is the board's only appropriate concern."
Revlon thus confirms that when the business judgment rule does not apply to
insulate the directors' decisions from judicial review, the board violates its fiduciary
duty of shareholder wealth maximization if it considers any interests other than
255 (2d Cir. 1984); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Abramson v.
Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). It is difficult to form a coherent picture from these cases, as
most courts outside of Delaware face corporate law issues on a sporadic basis, which precludes sustained
doctrinal development. Cf. Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The law in
this area is something less than a seamless web ... .
44. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
45. Id. at 956.
46. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
47. See id. at 182 ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."). A somewhat weaker formulation
was used in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), which allows consideration of
nonshareholder interests provided they bear "some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests." Id.
at 1282 n.29.
48. Compare Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affTd, 815 F.2d 76
(6th Cir. 1987) (employee stock ownership plan invalidated because there was "no evidence in the record as to
how the ESOP would benefit the shareholders nor as to how Ropak's tender offer posed a threat to Buckhorn's
employees") with Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 276 (Del. Ch. 1989) (employee
stock ownership plan upheld because it was "likely to add value to the company and all of its stockholders.").
49. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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those of the shareholders."0 In turn, this confirms that the duty to maximize share-
holder wealth is the principal obligation of directors, albeit one as to which the
business judgment rule sometimes bars judicial scrutiny.
B. Fiduciary Duties to Creditors?
Consistent with the conclusions drawn in the preceding section as to the corporate
social responsibility debate generally, the dominant view is that neither the corpo-
ration itself nor its officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to bondholders or
other creditors.5' Instead, "the relationship between a corporation and the holders
of its debt securities, even convertible debt securities, is contractual in nature." 2
The contract thus both defines and confines the scope of the corporation's obliga-
tions to its bondholders.
To be sure, a few cases purportedly hold to the contrary. Most of these cases,
however, involved fraudulent schemes or conveyances actionable outside the
bounds of corporate fiduciary obligation. 3 Other cases in this genre involve
recharacterization of nominal debt securities such as equity." Still others are mere
dicta. 5
The limited extra-contractual rights of bondholders thus are provided solely by
the implied covenant of good faith found in all contracts. Katz v. Oak Industries,"
for example, held that the implied covenant is breached when it is clear from the
50. Black & Decker Corp. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 786-87 (D. Del. 1988); C-T of Va., Inc.
v. Barrett, 124 B.R. 689 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990), superseded by statute as recognized in WLR Foods, Inc. v.
Tysons Foods, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 142 (W.D. Va. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
51. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
52. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
53. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (analyzing
cases).
54. See, e.g., Eliasen v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 569 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (discussing theory and
cases). In Eliasen, the Class B debentures in question had economic rights more closely resembling those of
common stock than normal debt. Id. at 85. The Class B debentures had no right to regular payment of interest,
but were paid interest only when the board chose and only after the nominal stockholders had been paid, and
the debentures came last in a liquidation. Id. The court nevertheless declined to treat the debentures as the
equivalent of stock because the Class B debentures had no voting rights and, moreover, were originally issued
in a reorganization of an insolvent debtor to creditors who would have been entitled to nothing in liquidation.
Id. at 97.
55. The classic example is Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the
court opined that "[als holders of convertible debentures, plaintiffs were part of 'the entire community of
interests in the corporation-creditors as well as stockholders' to whom the fiduciary duties of directors and
controlling shareholders run." Id. at 729 n.4 (quoting Justice Douglas' famous dictum in Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 307 (1939)). The passage from Green is mere dicta because the court simply determined that plain-
tiffs claim of fraud under Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5 could survive a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss. In addition, although Green purported to interpret Delaware law, the Delaware Supreme Court
specifically disavowed Green in Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303-04 (Del. 1988).
56. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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express terms of the indenture that the parties would have prohibited the chal-
lenged act if they had thought to negotiate about it:
[T]he appropriate legal test is not difficult to deduce. It is this: is it clear from
what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express
terms of the contract would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of
as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith-had they thought to negoti-
ate with respect to that matter. If the answer to this question is yes, then, in my
opinion, a court is justified in concluding that such act constitutes a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith.7
The oft-cited Met Life decision likewise invoked an implied covenant of good
faith, although its treatment of that covenant differed somewhat from Katz."8 In the
latter, the Chancery Court suggested that an implied covenant of good faith is part
of every contract. 9 In Met Life, however, the court suggested it would imply a
covenant of good faith only when necessary to ensure that neither side deprives the
other side of the "fruits of the agreement."6 The court then seemingly limited the
fruits of the bond indenture to regular payment of interest and ultimate repayment
of principal." In any case, the court made clear that "the implied covenant will only
aid and further the explicit terms of the agreement and will never impose an obli-
gation 'which would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relation-
ship." 2 Consequently, the implied covenant will not give bondholders any extra-
contractual rights inconsistent with those set out in the indenture.
Despite these and some minor semantic differences, however, the two cases are
quite similar in a number of respects. In particular, both Katz and Met Life con-
strain the implied covenant of good faith by reference to the express terms of the
contract.63 Taken together, the two decisions reflect a basic principle, captured by
the colloquialism "you made your bed, now you have to lie in it."
57. Id. at 880; see infa notes 76-84 (discussing Katz).
58. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Met Life arose out of the
leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. The new RJR Nabisco debt issued to
finance the LBO had the same bankruptcy priority as RJR Nabisco's pre-LBO debt. RJR Nabisco's equity
cushion thus was substantially diminished and the value of the existing debt was substantially reduced. The
pre-LBO bondholders claimed that their contract rights had been violated. Because the express terms of the
contract had not been violated, the court focused on the implied covenant of good faith.
59. Katz, 508 A.2d at 880.
60. Metro. Life Ins., 716 F. Supp. at 1517.
61. See id. at 1518 (explaining that "the substantive 'fruits' guaranteed by [the indenture] include the
periodic and regular payment of interest and the eventual repayment of principal.").
62. Id. at 1517 (citing Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 69 N.Y.2d 329, 335 (N.Y. 1987)).
63. Compare Katz, 508 A.2d at 880 (limiting the covenant to situations in which it is "dear from what was
expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed to
proscribe the act later complained of") with Metro. Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1517 (holding that the implied cove-
nant may only be invoked to "further the explicit terms of the agreement.").
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Do these rules change when the corporation is actually insolvent? Yes. Once the
corporation is actually insolvent, the directors owe fiduciary duties to the firm's
creditors.64
But what if the corporation merely is on the brink of insolvency? In Credit Lyon-
nais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,6" Delaware Chancellor
William Allen famously opined that: "At least where a corporation is operating in
the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue
risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise."66
Or, as Vice Chancellor Leo Strine explained:
The obligation of directors in that context of high risk and uncertainty...
was not "merely [to be] the agent of the residue risk bearers" but rather to
remember their fiduciary duties to "the corporate enterprise" itself, in the sense
that the directors have an obligation "to the community of interest that sus-
tained the corporation .... " and to preserve and, if prudently possible, to
maximize the corporation's value to best satisfy the legitimate claims of all its
constituents, and not simply to pursue the course of action that stockholders
might favor as best for them.67
Admittedly, this approach has a certain superficial appeal. A corporation pres-
ently in the vicinity of insolvency likely will eventually end up in bankruptcy for
either liquidation or reorganization. In bankruptcy, assuming the shareholders'
claim is wiped out the creditors effectively become the residual claimants to the
corporation's remaining assets. Because directors and officers generally owe their
fiduciary duties to the residual claimant, there thus is an argument for extending
fiduciary duties to creditors.
Before one assumes that Credit Lyonnais is settled Delaware law, however, con-
sider this cautionary note recently advanced by former Delaware Supreme Court
Chief Justice Norman Veasey:
64. See FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that "when the corporation
becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors."); Hender-
son v. Buchanan (In re Western World Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743, 763 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (holding that
when a "corporation is insolvent [the fiduciary of directors] run to creditors."); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v.
NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("When a firm has reached the point of insolvency, it
is settled that under Delaware law, the firm's directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the company's
creditors. This is an uncontroversial proposition ....") (footnote omitted); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621
A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (observing that "when the insolvency exception does arise, it creates fiduciary
duties for directors for the benefit of creditors."). On the question of when a corporation is insolvent, see
Zipora Cohen, Directors' Negligence Liability to Creditors: A Comparative and Critical View, 26 J. CORP. L. 351,
377-79 (2001).
65. Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
66. Id. at *34.
67. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 788.
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The Delaware Supreme Court has never directly addressed the vicinity of
insolvency issue, although one case involving the issue was appealed to the
court in 2000. The court affirmed the case on the basis of the Court of Chan-
cery's opinion and expressly stated that it did not reach the issue of "whether or
to what extent directors of a corporation said to be in the so-called 'vicinity of
insolvency' owe fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders." Thus, the questions
of what is the "vicinity of insolvency" and how must directors carry out their
fiduciary duties in that milieu are areas of future development in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence of fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule.8
At the least, this passage signals that the issue remains open; it may even signal
that the issue is in some doubt.
II. THE POLICY
As noted earlier, many scholars reject the shareholder wealth maximization princi-
ple on normative grounds; instead, they believe that, as a matter of sound social
policy, directors should have obligations to various nonshareholder constituencies
or, at the very least, be able to consider the impact of corporate actions on those
constituencies.69 In contrast, I have repeatedly defended the shareholder wealth
maximization standard on normative grounds." Accordingly, I do not intend to
rehash herein the general arguments in favor of the shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norm. Instead, I propose to focus on those arguments most directly relevant to
a corporation operating in the vicinity of insolvency.
A. A Duty to the Corporation?
Technically, Credit Lyonnais does not stand for the proposition that directors of a
corporation in the vicinity of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to creditors of the
corporation. Instead, Chancellor Allen held that the board of directors of such a
corporation "owes its duty to the corporate enterprise."'" In a famous footnote,
which is worth quoting at full length given its importance to the analysis, Chancel-
lor Allen went on to explain how such a duty differed from the usual conception
that directors owe their duties to the shareholders:
68. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and
Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1432 (2005)
(footnotes omitted).
69. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcONoMics 419-29 (2002); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 574-92
(2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor
Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993).
71. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613
at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing credi-
tors to risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors.
Consider, for example, a solvent corporation having a single asset, a judgment
for $51 million against a solvent debtor. The judgment is on appeal and thus
subject to modification or reversal. Assume that the only liabilities of the com-
pany are to bondholders in the amount of $12 million. Assume that the array
of probable outcomes of the appeal is as follows:
Expected
Value
25% Chance of affirmance ($51mm) $12.75
70% Chance of modification ($4mm) 2.8
5% Chance of reversal ($o) o
Expected Value of Judgment on Appeal $15.55
Thus, the best evaluation is that the current value of the equity is $3.55 mil-
lion. ($15.55 million expected value of judgment on appeal-$12 million liabil-
ity to bondholders). Now assume an offer to settle at $12.5 million (also
consider one at $17.5 million). By what standard do the directors of the com-
pany evaluate the fairness of these offers? The creditors of this solvent company
would be in favor of accepting either a $12.5 million offer or a $17.5 million
offer. In either event they will avoid the seventy-five percent risk of insolvency
and default. The stockholders, however, will plainly be opposed to acceptance
of a $12.5 million settlement (under which they get practically nothing). More
importantly, they very well may be opposed to acceptance of the $17.5 million
offer under which the residual value of the corporation would increase from
$3.5 to $5.5 million. This is so because the litigation alternative, with its
twenty-five percent probability of a $39 million outcome to them ($51 million
- $12 million = $39 million) has an expected value to the residual risk bearer
of $9.75 million ($39 million x 25% chance of affirmance), substantially
greater than the $5.5 million available to them in the settlement. While in fact
the stockholders' preference would reflect their appetite for risk, it is possible
(and with diversified shareholders likely) that shareholders would prefer rejec-
tion of both settlement offers.
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents it
seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement
offer available providing it is greater than $15.55 million, and one below that
amount should be rejected. But that result will not be reached by a director
who thinks he owes duties directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by
directors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and eco-
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nomic entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing the business af-
fairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may
arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors,
or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would
make if given the opportunity to act.72
Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Veasey has likewise embraced an
understanding of the problem centered on the notion that directors owe duties to
the corporate entity in this context, although we shall see that Veasey's analysis
ultimately proves to be somewhat more nuanced:
[Ilt is important to keep in mind the precise content of this "best interests"
concept-that is, to whom this duty is owed and when. Naturally, one often
thinks that directors owe this duty to both the corporation and the stockholders.
That formulation is harmless in most instances because of the confluence of
interests, in that what is good for the corporate entity is usually derivatively
good for the stockholders. There are times, of course, when the focus is directly
on the interests of stockholders. But, in general, the directors owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation, not to the stockholders. This provides a doctrinal
solution to the incentive problem that is entirely consistent with the empha-
sis on board governance, namely, that the board's duty is to do what is best
for the corporation."
From a doctrinal perspective, this emphasis on fiduciary duties to the corporate
entity is problematic. As to solvent corporations, the law already distinguishes be-
tween duties running to the corporate entity and to the shareholders. This distinc-
tion is what differentiates direct from derivative shareholder litigation, after all.
74
But if directors already owe some duties to the corporate entity, what changes doc-
trinally when the corporation is in the "vicinity of insolvency"? Credit Lyonnais
provides no answer.
Allen erred in an even more important way, however, because it is the duties that
run to the shareholder-or creditor, as the case may be-that are the relevant ones
in this context. Allen's highly stylized hypothetical conflated issues of pie expansion
and pie division. Suppose the board of directors faces with a true zero sum deci-
sion, in which the sole issue is how to divide a static sum between two or more
corporate constituencies. For all its detail, Allen's ahalysis fails to offer directors any
72. Id. at *34 n.55.
73. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 68, at 1431 (footnotes omitted).
74. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del. 2004) ("The stockholder
must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without
showing an injury to the corporation.").
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guidance for making that decision. This is so because, in the zero sum case, the
value of the corporate entity by definition will be unaffected by the decision. As
such, the directors' duties running to specific constituencies, rather than the entity,
are implicated in this setting.7"
It is difficult to square Allen's failure to grapple with the pie expansion/division
dichotomy in Credit Lyonnais with his more nuanced analysis in Katz v. Oak Indus-
tries.76 Katz involved the common situation in which a debtor attempts to avoid
bankruptcy through a workout including an exchange offer with bondholders. Oak
undertook a drastic downsizing and recapitalization involving the sale of a major
part of its business to Allied-Signal.77 The buyer also agreed to purchase $15 million
of newly issued common stock conditioned on a restructuring of Oak's debt.7" Oak
agreed to effect a series of exchange offers in which at least eighty-five percent of
Oak's debt securities would get cash or stock worth substantially less than the prin-
cipal amount of their present securities." Covenants in Oak's indentures prohibited
both the recapitalization and the exchange offers.8 ° Accordingly, Oak had to obtain
bondholder approval of appropriate amendments to the various indentures."' To do
so, Oak required the bondholders to consent to the requisite amendments as a
condition of participating in the exchange offer.82 Plaintiff objected to the transac-
tion on the grounds that it was "coercive."83 Chancellor Allen framed the issue not
as whether plaintiff was coerced, but as whether such coercion, if any, was "wrong-
ful." 84 He explained why in the following passage:
[T]he first aspect of the pending Exchange Offers about which plaintiff com-
plains-that "the purpose and effect of the Exchange Offers is to benefit Oak's
common stockholders at the expense of the Holders of its debt"--does not itself
appear to allege a cognizable legal wrong. It is the obligation of directors to
attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corpora-
tion's stockholders; that they may sometimes do so "at the expense" of others
(even assuming that a transaction which one may refuse to enter into can
75. In a related problem, Allen's formulation introduced a fundamental disconnect between the fiduciary
duties of directors of corporations in the vicinity of insolvency and those of directors of insolvent firms. Cohen
thus points to "the distinction that exists between the theory of the trust fund [applicable where the corpora-
tion is insolvent] and the ruling of the Delaware Chancery Court in the Credit Lyonnais case. Whereas the
former theory sees the interests of the creditors as the sole interests which corporate directors are allowed to
take into account in situations of insolvency, the judgment in the Credit Lyonnais case suggests consideration be
given to the interests of the firm as a whole." Cohen, supra note 64, at 381.
76. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
77. Id. at 876.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 877.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 879.
84. Id. at 879-80.
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meaningfully be said to be at his expense) does not for that reason constitute a
breach of duty. It seems likely that corporate restructurings designed to maxi-
mize shareholder values may in some instances have the effect of requiring
bondholders to bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect transfer economic
value from bondholders to stockholders. [ I But if courts are to provide protec-
tion against such enhanced risk, they will require either legislative direction to
do so or the negotiation of indenture provisions designed to afford such
protection."5
Instructively, "Oak's financial results" during the relevant time period showed "it
unmistakably to be a company in deep trouble." 6 It is thus quite difficult to square
Allen's forthright recognition of the pie division issue in Katz with Credit Lyonnais.
It is also quite difficult to square his forthright defense of shareholder wealth max-
imization in Katz with the inherently ambiguous duty to the corporate entity laid
out in Credit Lyonnais.
Finally, it is difficult to reconcile Allen's notion of a duty running to the corpo-
ration with the Delaware Chancery Court's well-known observation that "[iut is
obviously important that the Delaware corporate law have stability and predictabil-
ity."" Two key ambiguities plague the Credit Lyonnais analysis. First, what does it
mean to be in the "vicinity of insolvency?" 88 Second, as we have just seen, it is
difficult either to identify to whom the directors' duties run in this context or to
specify the content of those duties in this setting.89 Former Delaware Chief Justice
Veasey thus put it quite mildly when he observed that this "is certainly an area
where directors of troubled companies and their counsel face particular challenges
and need expert counseling.""
In addition to being doctrinally questionable, the notion that directors owe du-
ties to the corporate entity is inconsistent with the dominant contractarian theory
of the firm.9' The insistence that the firm is a real entity is a form of reification-
85. Id. at 879 (footnote and citations omitted).
86. Id. at 875.
87. Harffv. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. Ch. 1974).
88. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 68, at 1430 (noting "the vicinity of insolvency-whatever that
is") (emphasis added).
89. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 200 n. 88 (Del. Ch. 2006) ("As
[Bainbridge] points out, simply saying that a director owes duties to the firm does little to define what those
duties are and the end to which they are directed.").
90. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 68, at 1432.
91. In a thoughtful comment on an earlier draft of this article, Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine
defended the concept of"directors ow[ing] duties to the insolvent corporation itself .. " Trenwick Am. Litig.
Trust, 906 A.2d at 195 n.75. Strine's argument rests mainly on his conception of corporations "as societal
institutions freighted with the goal of responsible wealth creation." Id. I disagree with Strine's corporate social
responsibility-based approach both on general principle (see authorities cited supra note 70) and for the spe-
cific reasons developed below. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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i.e., treating an abstraction as if it has material existence.92 Reification is often use-
ful, or even necessary, because it permits us to utilize a form of shorthand-it is
easier to say General Motors did so and so than to attempt in conversation to
describe the complex process that actually may have taken place. Indeed, it is very
difficul t to think about large firms without reifying them. Reification, however, can
be dangerous. It becomes easy to lose sight of the fact that firms do not do things,
people do things.9"
In other words, the corporation is not a thing to which duties can be owed,
except as a useful legal fiction. The distinction between direct and derivative share-
holder litigation is one area in which that fiction long has been thought useful. This
Article is not the appropriate forum for determining whether distinguishing be-
tween direct and derivative litigation continues to make sense. 4 Having said that,
however, it nevertheless seems useful to note the implications of contractarian the-
ory for Credit Lyonnais' notion that the duties of directors of companies in the
vicinity of insolvency run to the entity.
At the outset, we must acknowledge that while the contractarian approach of
treating the corporation as a nexus of contracts is an improvement on entity-based
conceptions, it too is somewhat misleading. After all, to say that the firm is a nexus
is to imply the existence of a core or kernel capable of contracting. But kernels do
not contract-people do. In other words, it does us no good to avoid reifying the
firm by reifying the nexus at the center of the firm. Hence, it is perhaps best to
understand the corporation as having a nexus of contracts.
If the corporation has a nexus, where is it located? The Delaware code, like the
corporate law of every other state, gives us a clear answer: the corporation's "busi-
ness and affairs ...shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors."95 Put simply, the board of directors is the nexus of a set of contracts with
various constituencies that the law collectively treats as a legal fiction called the
corporation.96 As such, it simply makes no sense to think of the board of directors
as owing fiduciary duties to the corporate entity. Indeed, because the legal fiction
we call the corporate entity is really just a vehicle by which the board of directors
hires factors of production, it is akin to saying that the board owes duties to itself.
Former Chief Justice Veasey seemingly recognized at least some of these doctri-
nal and theoretical difficulties. For example, Veasey observed that:
92. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 117-18 (9th ed. 2004) (critiquing reification of the corporation).
93. See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 891 (2000) (arguing that "it is
dangerous to ignore the reality that firms transact only through individuals").
94. For some preliminary thoughts on that question, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 70, at 364-65 (calling
into question the utility of the direct versus derivative distinction).
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). For a summary of comparable state corporation code provi-
sions, see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 8.01 at 8-10 (Supp. 2005).
96. 1 developed this argument at length in Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of
Contracts, 88 IowA L. REV. 1 (2002).
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[W]hen a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency . . . creditors may be
considered to be in the pool of residual owners, and therefore become benefi-
ciaries of the fiduciary duties owed to the residual owners. Creditors' inclusion
in the pool need not imply that stockholders are thereby excluded, however."
Likewise, he further observed that:
[T]he directors' judgment could shade toward rights of creditors if that course
of action comports with the best interests of the corporate entity. Thus, it is
important to keep in mind the precise content of this "best interests" concept-
that is, to whom this duty is owed and when. [I This means that, as the
corporation slides toward insolvency, the benefits of maximizing the value of
the corporation will shift from stockholders to creditors, but, on this view, the
duties of the board remain the same.9"
In Veasey's formulation, the directors' duties to the shareholders thus morph
into a duty that somehow runs to both shareholders and creditors when the corpo-
ration is in the vicinity of insolvency." Although this solves the conceptual difficul-
ties with a duty running to the corporation, however, it introduces a new problem;
namely, the "two masters" issue."° Suppose that the board of directors is consider-
ing closing an obsolete plant. The closing will harm the plant's workers and the
local community, but will benefit shareholders, creditors, employees at a more
modern plant to which the work previously performed at the old plant is trans-
ferred, and communities around the modern plant. Assume that the latter groups
cannot gain except at the former groups' expense. By what standard should the
board make the decision? Shareholder wealth maximization provides a clear an-
swer-close the plant. Once the directors are allowed-or, required-to deviate
from shareholder wealth maximization, however, they must inevitably turn to in-
determinate standards balancing the interests of multiple parties. Veasey recognized
that such standards are highly problematic."'
Standards that require the directors to balance the interests of multiple constitu-
encies, shading between them from case to case, as Veasey puts it, deprive directors
of the critical ability to determine ex ante whether their behavior comports with the
97. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 68, at 1430.
98. Id. at 1431.
99. Veasey and Di Guglielmo do not explain why the fiduciary duties of directors "shade toward rights of
creditors" when the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, but not towards any of the corporation's many
other stakeholders. Id. Why, for example, does his formulation not permit those duties to shade towards the
firm's workers, who are affected adversely by insolvency at least as greatly as are creditors and shareholders? I
have been unable to find any Delaware precedent answering that question.
100. Cf Matthew 6:24 (stating "No one can serve two masters.").
101. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 68, at 1431 ("The obvious tension between the interests of creditors
and those of stockholders is palpable and a vexing challenge for directors.").
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law's demands, raising the transaction costs of corporate governance. The conflict
of interest rules governing the legal profession provide a useful analogy. Despite
many years of refinement, these rules are still widely viewed as inadequate, vague,
and inconsistent-hardly the stuff of which certainty and predictability are
made.)°2
Second, absent clear standards, directors will be tempted to pursue their own
self-interest. Directors who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one.
In the foregoing hypothetical, for example, if the board's interests favor keeping the
plant open, we can expect the board to at least lean in that direction. The plant
likely will stay open, with the decision being justified by reference to the impact of
a closing on the plant's workers and the local community. In contrast, if directors'
interests are served by closing the plant, the plant will likely close, with the decision
being justified by concern for the firm's shareholders, creditors, and other benefited
constituencies.
One may celebrate the virtues of granting directors largely unfettered discretion
to manage the business enterprise without having to ignore the agency costs associ-
ated with such discretion. Discretion should not be allowed to camouflage self-
interest. Whether one characterizes Credit Lyonnais as pointing the directors' duties
towards the corporate entity or its creditors, the decision threatens to provide just
such camouflage. The straightforward duty to shareholders Chancellor Allen set
out in Katz thus seems far preferable to the odd formulations espoused in Credit
Lyonnais and its progeny.
B. Will Shareholders Gamble with the Creditors Money?
Chancellor Allen's justification for the Credit Lyonnais principle rests in large part
on the notion that shareholders will have very different risk preferences than will
creditors.' °3 Insofar as it goes, of course, the point is indisputable.
Limited liability effectively allows shareholders to externalize risk onto creditors.
Suppose a corporation borrowed $2,000 from a bank to invest. There are two avail-
able investments: A and B, each of which has three possible pay-offs: best-case,
worst-case, and break-even.
0 4
102. See Nancy 1. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Pro-
posed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEx. L. REV. 211 (1982); Marc 1. Steinberg &
Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1, 2 (1990).
103. See supra text accompanying note 72 (quoting Chancellor Allen's analysis).
104. The example is a modified version of one used in MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORA-
TION LAW 33-34 (1995), which in turn drew on WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 228-29 (5th ed. 1993).
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Investment A
Probability Nominal Value Expected Value
Best-case 1o% $3,000 $300
Break-even 80% $2,000 $1,6OO
Worst-case 10% $1,OOO $100
Expected Value $2000
Investment B
Probability Nominal Value Expected Value
Best-case 20% $5,000 $1,000
Break-even 60% $2,000 $1,200
Worst-case 20% $0 $0
Expected Value $2,200
Investment B is the more risky of the two options. Both default risk (the risk that
the company will not be able to pay back its debt) and volatility risk (the likelihood
of an outcome other than the break-even scenario) are much higher in Investment
B.
In a world of zero transaction costs and unlimited liability-i.e., one in share-
holders are personally liable for corporate debts-the bank would be indifferent as
to which investment the company made. If the company fails, the bank can simply
collect from the shareholder. In a world of limited liability-i.e., one in which the
shareholders have no liability for the corporation's contract debts-the bank will
prefer Investment A. Even in the worst-case scenario, the bank will get half its
money back, plus there is a ninety percent probability the bank will be repaid in
full. The bank will not be impressed that Investment B offers a higher expected
return, because the bank has no claims on the residual. Anything over $2,000 goes
to the shareholders, not the bank (ignoring interest).
Conversely, shareholders will strongly prefer Investment B. Because creditors
(like the bank) have a prior claim on the firm's assets and earnings, they get paid
first; shareholders get the residual-whatever is left over. Shareholders thus prefer
projects offering potentially high rate of returns, so there will be something left
over after the creditors get paid.
The problem, of course, is that high return projects usually involve high levels of
risk.'0 5 The greater the risk, the more likely it becomes that the project will be
unsuccessful. In that event, it becomes more likely that the firm's income will not
suffice to pay the creditors, let alone leave anything over for the shareholders.
105. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC PRINCIPLES 44 (6th ed. 1996).
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Shareholders will not care about Investment B's greater risk, however, because the
doctrine of limited liability means their personal assets are not at risk. Limited
liability thus generates negative externalities by creating incentives for shareholders
to cause the company to invest in higher risk projects than would the firm's credi-
tors. Because shareholders do not put their personal assets at jeopardy, they effec-
tively externalize some portion of the risk associated with such investments to
creditors.
Although this discrepancy in risk preference is present even in solvent corpora-
tions, it becomes especially pronounced when the corporation is insolvent or in the
vicinity of insolvency." 6 Under those conditions, the shareholders may well be in-
clined to recall Will Roger's famous aphorism: "It's not so much the return on my
money that concerns me as much as the return of my money." Because the corpo-
ration is on the edge of a liquidation or reorganization in which the shareholders
are likely to receive neither a return on their investment nor, more impbrtantly, the
return of their investment, they now have an incentive to cause the corporation to
engage in particularly high-risk ventures. If the venture pays off with a substantial
return, they may be able to recoup at least their initial investment in the corpora-
tion. If the venture fails, they have lost nothing. Creditors thus bear the entire risk
associated with such ventures."'
This analysis jibes closely with Allen's justification for the Credit Lyonnais princi-
ple. Recall, for example, his argument that "insolvency can do curious things to
incentives, exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior and creating com-
plexities for directors," ' 8 which is precisely what the preceding analysis suggests
will happen. The Credit Lyonnais decision might thus be justified as necessary to
prevent "the shareholders, who were about to wind up with nothing," from taking
"an unreasonable gamble with the money that would have otherwise gone to the
creditors upon the dissolution of the firm."' 9
Unfortunately, for proponents of Credit Lyonnais the argument suffers from two
major flaws. First, as explained below in more detail,"' creditors can protect them-
selves ex ante either by negotiating contractual limitations on corporate behavior,
such as restrictions on the types of projects in which the firm may invest, or by
106. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1993) ("When the corporation is insolvent or at the brink of insol-
vency, the difference in risk preference between shareholders and creditors is magnified with respect to corpo-
rate investment policies.").
107. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 683-84 (1993).
108. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613,
at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
109. Morgan N. Neuwirth, Shareholder Franchise-No Compromise: Why the Delaware Courts Must Pro-
scribe All Managerial Interference with Corporate Voting, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 423, 473 n.273 (1996). See also
Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MAsoN L.
REV. 45, 49-51 (1998).
110. See infra Part III.C.
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negotiating for a share of the up-side, such as through the use of convertible debt
securities. Alternatively, creditors can force shareholders to internalize those risks
by charging a higher interest rate that compensates the creditor for the higher risk
of default. Indeed, the distinguishing characteristic of voluntary creditors (as op-
posed to involuntary creditors) is that they can allow for the risk of default in the
initial contract with the corporation."' Lenders, for example, factor in the risk of
default in calculating the interest rate. Thus, it matters little to the lender if an
individual corporation goes bankrupt (assuming diversification of risk). Although
the lender will sustain a loss as a result of the transaction with the bankrupt corpo-
ration, it will recoup that loss through the interest rate it receives from other bor-
rowers. In this way, voluntary creditors pass on the risk of default to the
shareholders, even in a system of limited liability.
Second, the shareholder incentive argument has traction only with respect to
firms in wlich the shareholders exercise effective control. As such, it has no appli-
cation to publicly held corporations, which are characterized by a separation of
ownership and control."2 Instead, the shareholder incentive argument applies only
to closely held corporations or quasi-public corporations in which there is a con-
trolling shareholder (or shareholder group). And, of course, it is in precisely such
firms where the costs of bargaining between shareholder(s) and creditors will be
low enough to allow the latter to negotiate ex ante particularized protections, such
as shareholder guarantees of corporate debts.
In a true public corporation, with no controlling shareholders, the power to
decide whether the firm invests in particular high-risk projects rests in the hands of
the board of directors and its subordinate managers. It is not clear that boards and
managers will systematically favor either the interests of shareholders or creditors:
A manager tainted by the company's financial problems might prefer to take
high risks because only they could lead to returns sufficiently. high to restore the
manager to favor. On the other hand, a manager whose job and company are
not in immediate jeopardy might prefer investments with risks that are lower
than those preferred by the company's investors.'
If agency cost economics teaches us anything, however, it causes us to suspect
that at least some directors and managers will put their own interests ahead of
111. Cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, Director's Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed
Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1245 (2003) (arguing for greater protection of creditors who have "low
levels of volition, cognition, and exit"-principally involuntary creditors). On the problem of involuntary trade
creditors, see infra note 127.
112. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
84-89 (1932).
113. LoPucki, supra note 107, at 684. Whether management's interests are aligned with those of creditors or
shareholders likely will also depend on whether management holds significant numbers of stock options. If not,
their claim on the corporation is a fixed one comparable to that of creditors.
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those of both shareholders and creditors at least some of the time."4 As such, the
real risk present when a public corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency is that of
managerial opportunism rather than strategic behavior by shareholders.
C. Which Constituencies Can Help Themselves?
Whether the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency or not, but perhaps espe-
cially when it is in that neighborhood, boards of directors often face decisions in
which it is not possible to achieve a Pareto optimal result.' Instead, they often face
decisions that will leave at least one constituency better off but also leave at least
one worse off. Suppose, for example, the board is faced with a decision having a
pay off for one constituency of $150 that leaves another constituency worse off by
$100. As a whole, the organization is better off by $50. In economic terms, this
decision is Kaldor-Hicks efficient." 6 What should the board do?
With this background in mind, the shareholder wealth maximization norm can
be described as a bargained-for term of the board-shareholder contract by which
the directors agree not to make Kaldor-Hicks efficient decisions that leave share-
holders worse off. A commonly used justification for adopting Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency as a decision-making norm is the claim that everything comes out in the
wash." 7 With respect to one decision, I may be in the constituency that loses, but
next time I will be in the constituency that gains. If the decision-making apparatus
is systematically biased against a particular constituency, however, that justification
fails. If shareholders suspect that their constituency would be systematically saddled
with losses, for example, they will insist on contract terms precluding directors
from making Kador-Hicks decisions that leave shareholders worse off. Specifically,
shareholders would bargain for terms imposing fiduciary duties on directors and
officers that incorporate the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
In contractarian theory, fiduciary duties are viewed as gap-fillers by which courts
resolve disputes falling through the cracks of incomplete contracts."' In particular,
fiduciary duties come into play when corporate directors and officers seek to ap-
propriate quasi-rents through opportunistic conduct unanticipated when the firm
114. Of course, various forces will constrain manager incentives. Accordingly, it is not surprising that
LoPucki and Whitford found only very limited evidence that managers of insolvent corporations were able to
exercise control so as to benefit themselves at the expense of other constituencies. See id. at 751 (summarizing
findings of a study of insolvent corporations).
115. A Pareto superior transaction makes at least one person better off and no one worse off. See generally
DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 154-55 (1990) (describing Pareto efficiency).
116. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require that no one be made worse off by a reallocation of resources.
Instead, it requires only that the resulting increase in wealth be sufficient to compensate the losers. Note that
there does not need to be any actual compensation, compensation simply must be possible. ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41-42 (2d ed. 1997).
117. The validity of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a guide to public policy is sharply disputed. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 91-94 (Harvard Univ. Press 1981); Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic
Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547, 554-55 (1993).
118. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 92.
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was formed (and, accordingly, not dealt with ex ante by contract). Quasi-rents arise
where investments in transaction-specific assets create a surplus that is subject to
expropriation by the contracting party having control over the assets." ' A transac-
tion specific asset is one whose "value is appreciably lower in any other use than the
transaction in question. 2 ' Once a transaction specific investment has been made,
"it generates quasi-rents"-i.e., returns in excess of that necessary to maintain the
asset in its current use.' If such quasi-rents are appropriable by the party with
control of the transaction specific asset, a hold up problem ensues. Investments in
transaction specific assets therefore commonly are protected through specialized
governance structures created by detailed contracts. As we have seen, however,
under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, bounded rationality precludes
complete contracting.'22 Under such conditions, accordingly, fiduciary duties pro-
vide an alternative source of protection against opportunism.
The shareholder's investment in the firm is a transaction specific asset, because
the whole of the investment is both at risk and turned over to someone else's con-
trol.'23 In contrast, many corporate constituencies do not make firm specific invest-
ments in either human capital or otherwise. Because the relationship between such
constituencies and the corporation does not create appropriable quasi-rents, op-
portunism by the board is not a concern for them.
Consequently, shareholders are more vulnerable to director misconduct than are
most nonshareholder constituencies. To be sure, some scholars assert that "when
directors use their corporate position to steal money from the firm, every" constit-
uency suffers.'24 Consider, however, a classic case of self-dealing. Assume a solvent
corporation able to pay its debts and other obligations (especially employee sala-
ries) as they come due in the ordinary course of business. Further assume that the
corporation has substantial free cash flow-i.e., cash flows in excess of the positive
net present value investments available to the corporation. If the directors siphon
some portion of the corporation's free cash flow into their own pockets, sharehold-
ers are clearly hurt, because the value of the residual claim has been impaired. Yet,
in this case, there is no readily apparent injury to the value of the fixed claim of all
other corporate constituents.
For the sake of argument, however, I will assume herein that appropriation of
quasi-rents is an equally severe problem for both shareholders and nonshareholder
119. See Benjamin R. Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
120. Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 1. EcoN. PERSP. 73, 74
(1998).
121. Id. at 74 n.1. The asset may also generate true rents-i.e., returns exceeding that necessary to induce
the investment in the first place-but the presence or absence of true rents is irrelevant to the opportunism
problem. See id. (discussing true rents).
122. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
123. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1209 (1984).
124. Blair & Stout, supra note 36, at 299.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE
constituencies. This is most obviously true in the case of employees who invest in
firm specific human capital. 5 Creditors may also develop firm specific expertise,
however, particularly in long-term relationships with a significant number of re-
peat transactions.12
6
Relative to many nonshareholder constituencies, shareholders are poorly posi-
tioned to extract contractual protections.'27 Unlike bondholders, for example,
whose term-limited relationship to the firm is subject to extensive negotiations and
detailed contracts, shareholders have an indefinite relationship that is rarely the
product of detailed negotiations. The dispersed nature of stockownership, moreo-
ver, makes bilateral negotiation of specialized safeguards especially difficult:
Arrangements among a corporation, the underwriters of its debt, trustees
under its indentures and sometimes ultimate investors are typically thoroughly
negotiated and massively documented. The rights and obligations of the vari-
ous parties are or should be spelled out in that documentation. The terms of
the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts such as fairness
[therefore] define the corporation's obligation to its bondholders.2 '
Put another way, bond indentures necessarily are incomplete.'29 Even so, they
still provide bondholders with far greater contractual protections than shareholders
125. Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 280
(1996).
126. Id.
127. The analysis herein applies mainly to voluntary constituencies of the firm. Obviously, involuntary
creditors cannot protect themselves by ex ante bargaining. Some scholars, moreover, contend that certain nom-
inally voluntary creditors, such as trade creditors, cannot protect themselves by bargaining. See, e.g., William P.
Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 860-64
(1982). Such concern for trade creditors is misplaced. Trade creditors concerned about the risk preferences
created by limited liability should simply raise their interest rates or refuse to transact except on a cash basis.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 663 (1996)
(pointing out that "trade creditors have various ways to protect themselves at the initial transaction stage, such
as shortening payment terms or requiring contemporaneous or even prior payment. Trade creditors seeking
additional protection can even demand purchase money security interests to secure repayment."). In any case,
corporate law is an exceptionally blunt instrument with which to protect involuntary constituencies (and vol-
untary constituencies, as well, for that matter). Tort, contract, and property law, as well as a host of general
welfare laws, provide them with panoply of protections. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis
of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991).
128. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
129. See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduci-
ary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 234 (1999) (stating that "[aIll contracts have gaps."). The claim here is simply
that the shareholder-corporation contract is especially "gappy." The ownership-like rights conferred by the
shareholder's contract follow from this phenomenon. Cf. George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, Empirical
Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm, 2001 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 189, 192
(finding that technological developments promoting contractibility within the trucking industry led to vertical
integration).
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receive from the corporate contract as represented by the firm's organic
documents.'
In addition, as implied in the passage just quoted from former Chancellor Allen's
Katz opinion, the underwriting process ensures that the indenture will contain effi-
cient protections for bondholders. Some argue that the underwriters have a pecuni-
ary interest in pleasing the issuer, not the bondholders, 3' but the relationship
between underwriters and bondholders is a classic repeat transaction phenomenon.
Underwriters will not sully their reputation with bondholders for the sake of one
issuer.'32 In a firm commitment underwriting, moreover, the underwriters buy the
securities from the issuer. If the indenture does not provide adequate levels of pro-
tection, the underwriters will be unable to sell the bonds.'33
Portfolio theory further suggests that bondholders are fully compensated for the
risks posed by potential breaches of fiduciary duty. Arguably, such risks are unsys-
tematic in nature, so that the bondholders can eliminate them by holding a diversi-
fied portfolio.'34 Even if such risks are characterized as systematic risks, moreover,
130. Unlike secured creditors or employees with firm specific human capital, the shareholder's transaction
specific investment is not associated with particular assets. See Romano, supra note 125, at 279. Also unlike
other corporate constituents, shareholders have no right to periodic renegotiation of the firm's of their rela-
tionship with the firm. As a result, the shareholders' interest in the firm is more vulnerable to both uncertainty
and opportunism than are those of other corporate constituents. Unlike those corporate constituents whose
interests are adequately protected by contract, shareholders therefore require special protection. Hence, both
the shareholder right to elect directors and the fiduciary obligation of those directors to maximize shareholder
wealth. See id. at 279-80.
131. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165,
1183 (1990); see also Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate Over Corpo-
rate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (noting potential conflicts of interest on the part of
underwriters).
132. Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 565, 591-92
(1995).
133. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 647,
660 (1996) (noting that "underwriters negotiate the covenants in anticipation of selling the bonds to inves-
tors."). The issuer's board and management has a strong self-interest in holding down the corporation's cost of
capital, e.g., avoiding takeovers, maximizing personal wealth, and avoiding the adverse consequences of firm
failure. Because directors and managers cannot diversify away the risk of firm failure, as shareholders can, they
are more risk averse than shareholders with respect to conduct that could raise the firm's cost of debt capital. If
directors and managers pursue shareholder wealth at the expense of bondholders, however, such conduct will
come back to haunt the management the next time it uses the bond market to raise capital. Coupled with the
fact that their non-diversifiable interest in firm failure means that board and officer risk preferences typically
are closer to those of creditors than of shareholders, their self-interest provides significant protections for
bondholders.
134. Unsystematic risk can be thought of as firm-specific risk. STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 287 (6th ed. 2002). In contrast, systematic risk can be regarded as market risk, because systematic risks
affect all firms to one degree or another. Id at 288. Investors can eliminate unsystematic risk by diversifying
their portfolio. Id. at 294. Thus, even though the actual rate of return earned on a particular investment is
likely to diverge from the expected return, the actual return on a well-diversified portfolio is less likely to
diverge from the expected return. A well-diversified investor thus need not be concerned with unsystematic risk
and therefore will not demand to be compensated for that risk. Id. at 296. Systematic risk by definition cannot
be eliminated by diversification, because it affects all stocks. Id. at 294. Accordingly, investors will demand to be
compensated for bearing systematic risk. Id. at 296.
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the pricing mechanism will ensure a rate of interest that compensates the bond-
holders for those risks.
In sum, it seems clear that creditors are well positioned-especially relative to
shareholders-to protect themselves. 3 ' Accordingly, we can confidently predict the
majoritarian default that would emerge from the hypothetical bargain. Sharehold-
ers will want the protections provided by fiduciary duties, while bondholders will
be satisfied with the ability to enforce their contractual rights, which is precisely
what the law provides. Credit Lyonnais thus threatens to give bondholders a wind-
fall for which they have not bargained.
D. Summation
Credit Lyonnais was a doctrinal innovation that departed significantly from pre-
existing Delaware law, which had limited creditors to their bargained-for contrac-
tual rights and obliged directors to focus on shareholder wealth maximization. As
doctrinal innovations go, moreover, Credit Lyonnais was particularly unsound. It
introduced uncertainty into the law, depriving directors of the ex ante guidance on
which Delaware corporate law appropriately prides itself.'36
As a matter of public policy, Credit Lyonnais was equally unsound. Its notion
that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporate entity when that entity is in the
vicinity of insolvency is untenable as a matter of economic theory and difficult to
135. Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine observes:
It is presumed that creditors are capable of protecting themselves through the contractual agreements
that govern their relationships with firms. Furthermore, a specific body of law-the law of fraudulent
conveyance-exists precisely to protect creditors. And, of course, important elements of federal
bankruptcy law also protect creditors. Given that these legal tools exist to protect creditors, our
corporate law (and that of most of our nation) expects that the directors of a solvent firm will cause
the firm to undertake economic activities that maximize the value of the firm's cash flows primarily
for the benefit of the residual risk-bearers, the owners of the firm's equity capital. So long as the
directors honor the legal obligations they owe to the company's creditors in good faith, as fiduciaries
they may pursue the course of action that they believe is best for the firm and its stockholders.
Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch. 2004). Likewise, Delaware Vice
Chancellor Noble explains that:
[C]reditors' existing protections-among which are the protections afforded by their negotiated
agreements, their security instruments, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudu-
lent conveyance law, and bankruptcy law-render the imposition of an additional, unique layer of
protection through direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty unnecessary. See, e.g., Big Lots Stores,
Inc., 2006 WL 846121, at *8 (remarking, in the context of an insolvent corporation: "As numerous
commentators have observed, creditors are usually better able to protect themselves than dispersed
shareholders." (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in
the Vicinity ofInsolvency, J. BUS. & TECH. L. (forthcoming) http:// ssrn.com/abstract-832504 at 30)
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Rob Gheewalla, No. Civ.A. 1456-N, 2006 WL 2588971, at
"13 & n.122 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006).
136. See Barondes, supra note 109, at 72-73 (discussing how Credit Lyonnais introduced various sources of
uncertainty into the law); Lipson, supra note 111, at 1211 ("The chief criticism is that the holding of the case-
if there is one-creates uncertainty."); cf. Schwarcz, supra note 133, at 671 ("Directors who are expected to
labor under a dual loyalty must be able to determine when that loyalty arises.").
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operationalize in practice. The concern that shareholders will gamble with the
creditors' money, which implicitly underlies Credit Lyonnais, is unpersuasive. In
corporations where that might be a concern due to the presence of controlling
shareholders able to determine corporate policy, the creditors can protect them-
selves ex ante through negotiations with that shareholder, by insisting on the share-
holder giving a personal guarantee. In true public corporations, the real concern is
not shareholder but managerial opportunism. As between shareholders and credi-
tors, the latter again are better able to protect themselves through ex ante con-
tracting. Credit Lyonnais thus gives bondholders and other creditors a second bite
at the apple.'37
In sum, the default rule of corporate law ought to recognize that shareholders
bargained for the right to gamble with the creditors' money even when the corpo-
ration is in the vicinity of insolvency. Creditors who object to that right can and
should protect themselves ex ante. If they fail to do so, the law should take the "you
made your bed, now you must lie in it" attitude that motivated former Chancellor
Allen's Katz opinion rather than following Credit Lyonnais.'
III. DOES IT MATTER?
Consider the facts that were at issue in Katz.'39 Oak Industries was in deep financial
trouble, having experienced unremitting losses for the previous 45 months. The
common stock's market price had fallen from $30 to $2 per share and Oak's debt
traded at substantial discounts to par. In hopes that an infusion of new equity
capital would turn things around, Oak entered into an agreement with Allied Sig-
nal, pursuant to which the latter would purchase certain of Oak's assets for $160
million in cash and also would invest an additional $15 million in Oak by purchas-
ing newly issued common stock and warrants.
137. Cf. C. Robert Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais,
19 J. CORP. L. 61, 64-65 (1993) (criticizing "judicial insulation from" the risk of corporate default as "over-
protection.").
138. In Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), Delaware
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine acknowledged this argument:
Professor Bainbridge is critical of jurisprudence that expresses the view that directors owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation itself, rather than a particular constituency of the corporation. See Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency (forth-
coming 2006), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=832504; Duties of Directors of Insolvent Corpo-
rations, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2006/07/duties.ofdirec.html (July 26, 2006). When a
corporation is solvent, Professor Bainbridge believes that fiduciary duties are owed by the directors to
the stockholders. Bainbridge, Much Ado, at 5-6. When a corporation is insolvent, he accepts the
notion that the directors owe their fiduciary duties to the creditors, because the creditors are now the
residual claimants. Id. at 15.
Id. at 195 n.75. As we have seen, Strine disagrees with the proposition that the duties of directors relevant to the
context at hand run to the shareholders or creditors rather than to the entity. See supra note 91. As we shall see,
however, Strine concurs with the proposition that the business judgment rule normally will be the relevant
standard of review. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
139. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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Allied Signal conditioned the deal on a restructuring of Oak's existing debt to be
effected via a tender offer in which Oak would buy back some debt at a premium
over the debt's then current market price but at a discount to par. Debt holders
accepting the offer would be obliged to execute exit consents authorizing indenture
amendments eliminating various protections, including all financial covenants.
Without the amendments, Allied Signal was unwilling to enter into either the eq-
uity investment or asset purchase.
Assume Oak was in the vicinity of insolvency at the time the restructuring plan
was approved by Oak's board of directors. A creditor sues the board alleging breach
of the Credit Lyonnais fiduciary duty. The creditor argues that the deal was struc-
tured to disadvantage creditors to the shareholders' benefit.
To justify that claim, the creditor offers the following analysis of the transaction's
effect: I hold five Oak bonds, each having a par value of $1,000. The prevailing
market price is around $600, but I believe that bondholders would realize $700 per
bond if Oak were forced into a liquidation or reorganization in bankruptcy. Oak is
offering us $650 per bond in the tender offer, but in order to accept the offer I
must execute a consent that will amend the indenture to eliminate covenants
prohibiting the payment of dividends and the incurrence of debt senior to my
bonds. If I hold onto my bonds, and a majority of other holders tender, the bonds I
will be left with, stripped of their protective covenants, will be worth $575. I there-
fore face a classic prisoners' dilemma. I will accept the $650 offered by Oak, and
execute the consent, in order to protect myself against the risk of winding up with
bonds worth only $575.
What standard of review will a Delaware court apply on these facts, assuming
arguendo that the creditor is owed some sort of fiduciary duty under Credit Lyon-
nais? According to Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, the answer almost cer-
tainly is the business judgment rule:
The Credit Lyonnais decision's holding and spirit clearly emphasized that
directors would be protected by the business judgment rule if they, in good
faith, pursued a less risky business strategy precisely because they feared
that a more risky strategy might render the firm unable to meet its legal
obligations to creditors and other constituencies.'40
140. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004) (footnote omitted).
See also Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Commc'ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("My
preliminary view is that, even where the law recognizes that the duties of directors encompass the interests of
creditors, there is room for application of the business judgment rule."); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 68,
at 1430 ("Directors will normally have discretion to exercise their business judgment, provided they do so in
good faith."). In a later opinion, which cited an early draft of this article, Vice Chancellor Strine stated that
"Professor Bainbridge's views regarding the substantive effect the question of insolvency should have on direc-
tors' ability to rely upon the business judgment rule and on the application of the derivative/direct claim
distinction is identical to mine-short answer: none .... Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust, 906 A.2d at 195 n.75.
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Accordingly, so long as the board of directors is independent and disinterested
and otherwise satisfies the preconditions for application of the business judgment
rule, the court will invoke the rule and abstain from reviewing the merits of the
board's decision.'
4
'
The rationale for applying the business judgment rule in this context follows in
part from the same policy considerations evaluated in the preceding Part:
Creditors are often protected by strong covenants, liens on assets, and other
negotiated contractual protections. The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing also protects creditors. So does the law of fraudulent conveyance. With
these protections, when creditors are unable to prove that a corporation or its
directors breached any of the specific legal duties owed to them, one would
think that the conceptual room for concluding that the creditors were somehow,
nevertheless, injured by inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if ex-
tant. Having complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm's creditors,
the board would, in that scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic risk for
the benefit of the firm's equity owners, so long as the directors comply with
their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting and pursuing with fidelity and
prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm's value.'42
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, however, application of the business
judgment rule follows necessarily from the basic architecture of corporate govern-
ance. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained:
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fun-
damental principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law]
§ 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed
by or under its board of directors. [] The business judgment rule exists to
protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted
to Delaware directors.'43
141. Cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000), stating that
[d]irectors' decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack indepen-
dence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a
rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the
failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.
142. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 790.
143. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). Cf Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y.
1996) (noting that "shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the managerial discretion of corporate boards.
[ I Consequently, we have historically been reluctant to permit shareholder derivative suits, noting that the
power of courts to direct the management of a corporation's affairs should be 'exercised with restraint."'); see
also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (noting that "the derivative action impinges on the mana-
gerial freedom of directors").
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The business judgment rule thus operationalizes the intuition that fiat-the cen-
tralization of decision-making authority-is the essential attribute of efficient cor-
porate governance.
44
As Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow explains, authority and accounta-
bility cannot be reconciled:
[Accountability mechanisms] must be capable of correcting errors but should
not be such as to destroy the genuine values of authority. Clearly, a sufficiently
strict and continuous organ of [accountability] can easily amount to a denial
of authority. If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have
really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and hence no solution to
the original problem.'45
The business judgment rule prevents such a shift in the locus of decision-making
authority from boards to judges. It does so by establishing a limited system for
case-by-case oversight in which judicial review of the substantive merits of those
decisions is avoided. The court begins with a presumption against review. 46 It then
reviews the facts to determine not the quality of the decision, but rather whether
the decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing and the like.147 The ques-
tions asked are objective and straightforward: Did the board commit fraud? Did the
board commit an illegal act? Did the board self-deal? Whether or not the board
exercised reasonable care is irrelevant, as well it should be. 4 ' The business judg-
ment rule thus erects a prophylactic barrier by which courts pre-commit to re-
sisting the temptation to review the merits of the board's decision.'49
144. In Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 374 (Del. Ch. 2004), appeal refused by
871 A.2d 1128 (Del. 2004), Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine noted "the director-centered nature of our law,
which leaves directors with wide managerial freedom subject to the strictures of equity, including entire fair-
ness review of interested transactions. It is through this centralized management that stockholder wealth is
largely created ...."
145. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974).
146. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the rule creates a presump-
tion that the directors or officers "ofa corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.").
147. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d
993 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1976), (stating that absent "fraud, dishonesty or nonfeasance," the court would not
substitute its judgment for that of the directors).
148. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983), and cert. denied, Baldwin v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), (stating: "While it is often stated that corporate
directors and officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that
such a statement is misleading. I ] Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon
corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful
business decisions has been doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule."); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
262-64 (Del. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that the business judgment rule includes an element of
"substantive due care" and holding that the business judgment rule requires only "process due care").
149. Cf. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 68, at 1422 (describing this analysis as being consistent with the
"Delaware doctrine that the rule is a presumption that courts will not interfere with, or second-guess, decision
making by directors.").
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As I have explained elsewhere in much more detail, judicial abstention from
merits review of board decisions has several critical advantages. 5 ' First, judges
necessarily have less information about the needs of a particular firm than do that
firm's directors. A fortiori, judges will make poorer decisions than the firm's board.
In addition, while market forces work a sort of Darwinian selection on corporate
decision makers, no such forces constrain erring judges.' 5' As such, rational share-
holders might prefer the risk of managerial error to that of judicial error.
Second, the firm's residual claimants do not get a return on their investment
until all other claims on the corporation have been satisfied. All else being equal,
the residual claimant-whether it be a shareholder or, in insolvency, a creditor-
will prefer high return projects. Because risk and return are directly proportional,
however, implementing that preference necessarily entails choosing risky projects.
Board decisions rarely involve black-and-white issues, however; instead, they typi-
cally involve prudential judgments among a number of plausible alternatives. Given
the vagaries of business, moreover, even carefully made choices among such alter-
natives may turn out badly. Unfortunately, both residual claimants and judges will
find it difficult to distinguish between competent and negligent management. By
virtue of hindsight bias, bad outcomes are often regarded, ex post, as foreseeable ex
ante. If bad outcomes result in liability, however, managers will be discouraged
from taking risks."5 2
The critical point for present purposes is that nothing in the preceding precis of
the rationale for the business judgment rule depends on the question "to who are
directors accountable?" There will be an unavoidable tension between authority
and accountability whether directors, owe duties to the shareholders, the creditors,
the entity, or some combination thereof. Allowing courts to review the merits of
board decisions will inevitably shift some aliquot of the board's authority to courts
whether such review is triggered by shareholders, the creditors, the entity, or some
combination thereof. Accordingly, absent a disabling conflict of interest on the part
of the board, the business judgment rule should be the standard of review whether
fiduciary litigation is brought by shareholders, the creditors, the entity, or some
combination thereof.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the zone debate is much ado about nothing or, perhaps more precisely,
about very little. In the vast majority of cases, the business judgment rule will
preclude judicial review regardless of whether suit is brought by shareholders or
creditors. In some cases, the business judgment rule may not apply, but suit will be
150. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83,
127-129 (2004).
151. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 100
(1991).
15i. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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derivative in nature and any recovery will go to the entity regardless of whether suit
is brought by shareholders or creditors. As a result, the only cases in which the zone
of insolvency debate matters are those to which the business judgment rule does
not apply, shareholder and creditor interests conflict, and a recovery could go di-
rectly to those who have standing to sue. In those few cases, this Article has argued,
creditors should be limited to whatever rights the contract provides or might be
inferred from the implied covenant of good faith.
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